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A Habermasian perspective on joint meaning making online: What does it offer 
and what are the difficulties? 
ABSTRACT  
This paper is an exploration of the relevance of Habermas’s social theory for 
understanding meaning making in the context of shared online interaction. It describes 
some of the key ideas within Habermas’s work, noting the central importance it gives to 
the idea of communicative action - a special kind of discourse in which there is ‘no other 
force than that of the better argument’ and no other motive other than ‘the cooperative 
search for truth’. The paper then turns to the referencing of Habermas by educationalists 
in general and by supporters of online discussion in particular.  It argues that a 
Habermasian perspective on meaning making is one in which participants strive for 
‘genuine consensus’ by interrogating their own beliefs while actively engaging with 
opposing points of view. The value of this approach is that it introduces a concern for 
validity or truth into discussion of knowledge building and discriminates between 
emancipatory and strategic goals. While critics would argue that genuine consensus is not 
achievable, from Habermas we can better understand the importance of striving for such 
consensus.  
Key words: intersubjectivity; Habermas; Critical Theory; CSCL 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is an exploration of the relevance of Habermas’s social theory for 
understanding meaning making online.  It describes some of the key ideas within 
Habermas’s work, noting the central importance it gives to the idea of communicative 
action. The paper then describes the importance Habermas has had for educationalists 
and for those promoting a more discursive approach to joint meaning making in both 
formal and informal contexts. Finally, the implications of a Habermasian approach are 
explained, highlighting value and difficulties.  The paper draws on a range of literature 
within both formal and informal learning contexts; most of this literature concerns text 
based communication, often, but not always, in asynchronous contexts.  
BACKGROUND TO HABERMAS 
Habermas is much celebrated as a social theorist, though his interdisciplinary 
commitment and range of interests means that his work defies easy categorisation. His 
intellectual roots lie in Critical Theory (Habermas, 1992: 211-222) and as such Habermas 
is concerned with contrasting social and political realities with missed opportunities for 
democratic / emancipatory action. As with Critical Theory in general, Habermas is a 
critic of positivism, and a taken for granted ‘scientism’ in which problems are addressed 
with purely technical solutions (see, for example, Habermas, 1972: 65 – 186). However 
his work is often contrasted to other critical theorists due to its underlying optimism 
about human development and, in particular, about the possibilities that language 
provides for communicative discourse. 
Habermas’s concern for discourse is closely tied to his early exploration of the concept 
of the public sphere. For Habermas this was a: 
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realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be 
formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere 
comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to 
form a public body (Habermas, 1974 [1964]: 49).  
Habermas saw the material basis for a public sphere in the emergence of a literate 
bourgeoisie in 18th century Europe. Of particular significance was the rise of a free press 
and, in spite of the restrictions and outright manipulation faced by the media, he has 
continued to acknowledge and value the existence of a public sphere – one which allows 
open debate, including the expression of counter cultural voices, distinct from ‘public 
opinion’ (Habermas, 2006). 
Habermas has contributed significantly to academic and public debate and his later work 
has covered a very broad range of topics including German history, European integration 
and multiculturalism (for example Habermas and Dews, 1992; Habermas, 1998). 
However of most concern to education theorists has been his concept of communicative 
action and his notion of an ideal speech community.  
Habermas shared with interpretivist social theory a rejection of the idea that what we 
know and validate as knowledge represents a correspondence to an objective reality. 
Rather he drew on the pragmatist tradition, in particular the work of Pierce, to see 
knowledge as emerging through intersubjective agreements on social problems 
(Habermas, 1972: 112). However he departed from neo-pragmatists such as Rorty by 
raising the possibility that valid claims to knowledge could be reached. It is a risky move 
to associate truth or validity with agreement and Habermas was cautious. However he 
held out the belief that, at least in principle, consensus could lead to ‘truth’ or rather 
something we should recognise as true. This was a position that Habermas contrasted 
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with post modernism, for post modernism tended to throw doubt upon the possibility of 
reaching rationally derived consensus (see, for example, Habermas, 1987).  
Central to Habermas’s work was communicative action. This was not straightforward as 
a concept and was refined over time, but at heart was the idea that:  
...I call interactions ‘communicative’ when the participants coordinate their plans 
of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated 
in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims….. Those claims are 
claims to truth, claims to rightness, and claims to truthfulness, depending on 
whether the speaker refers to something in the objective world (as the totality of 
existing states of affairs), to something in the shared social world (as the totality 
of the legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships of a social group), or to 
something in his own subjective world (as the totality of experiences to which 
one has privileged access) (Habermas, 1990: 58). 
Here for Habermas there was the possibility of establishing truth through rational 
consensus albeit establishing different kinds of truth would require the marshaling of 
different types of evidence. Habermas spent much time and intellectual effort in 
considering the different purposes for using language, for example drawing a distinction 
between illocutionary and other acts and describing their consequences for 
communication, but he also recognised that there were claims to truth or rightness which 
needed to go beyond textual analysis. For example claims to truthfulness needed to be 
consistent with behavior: ‘a person can convince someone that he means what he says 
through his actions, not by giving reasons’ (Habermas, 1990: 58). 
Habermas throughout his work wanted to identify communicative action as a special 
kind of discourse in which there was ‘no other force than that of the better argument’ 
and no other motive other than ‘the cooperative search for truth’. Communicative 
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action, with its emancipatory potential, could be contrasted with strategic action in which 
interaction was manipulated by the ‘threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratification’ to 
gain an advantage over another individual or group.  This cooperative search for truth, or 
what might be more easily described as a search for genuine consensus, needed to take 
place in a kind of ideal speech situation in which those with competence were allowed to 
speak, no one was constrained in speaking, all were allowed to question the grounds for 
any assertion and new assertions could be put forward.  The ideal speech situation 
belonged in the Weberian tradition of ‘ideal types’, an abstraction to throw light on the 
key features of a case. Not all speech endlessly recreated the conditions for ideal speech: 
indeed these conditions were ‘improbable’. Rather for communication to take place it 
was assumed that we could revisit ideal speech conditions and we could distinguish 
between a genuine and false consensus.  
Habermas’s view of communicative action was process oriented; he had much less to say 
as to what we would reach consensus about and it could be assumed that we would find 
it difficult to reach consensus on many issues. However striving for consensus remained 
central to Habermas as it offered a way of marrying individual subjectivity and individual 
rights with a universalist moral ethic based on mutual recognition. The search for 
consensus required an active attempt to see the world through the eyes of the ‘other’ and 
to recognise ways in which one’s own understanding of a situation may be distorted by 
one’s own subjectivity and the social roles one was expected to play. Indeed Habermas, 
drawing in particular on Kohlberg’s work on child development (Habermas, 1979:  69-
94), associated maturity both in individuals and societies with the exercise of reflexivity, a 
commitment to moral and individual freedom and recognition of the rights of others.  
Thus while continuing to recognise intellectual freedom as a legacy of the 
Enlightenment, his concern with mutual recognition led him to criticise classical 
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liberalism for reducing ethical liberty to a ‘possessive-individualist reading of subjective 
rights, misunderstood in instrumentalist terms’ (Habermas, 2005: 2).   
The strength of Habermas’s work lies in its attempt to address tensions inherent in 
complex, democratic societies such as ‘How can we be concerned both with consensus 
and with recognising counter-cultural voices?’  ‘How can we think about knowledge both 
as socially constructed and valid?’ ‘How can we have a social theory that is both 
sociological and raises questions of ethics and morality?’ Only his most uncritical 
supporters would say that he holds all the answers but he has consistently and 
imaginatively addressed the right questions, using a range of sources from classical 
philosophy, Marxist theory, and empirical sociology.  
WHAT HAS HABERMAS GOT TO DO WITH EDUCATION? 
The implications of Habermas’s work for education are not explicit: Indeed the 
implications for the conduct of social investigation in general are much more at the level 
of underlying assumptions about epistemology and ontology rather than frameworks for 
action. However, Habermas has, by virtue of the range and depth of writing, stimulated 
thinking about educational practice both directly (for example Brookfield, 2005; 
Englund, 2006; Ewert, 1991; Murphy & Bamber, 2012) and indirectly (for example 
Barnett, 2004; Van Manen, 1977). He is best known to practitioner-researchers through 
Carr and Kemmis’s (1986) attempt to define the concept of critical action research and to 
adult educators via Mezirow’s concept of transformative learning (Mezirow, 1997).  
Habermas’s work is referenced too in the context of online learning. Indeed his theory of 
communicative action seems to fit very well with the idea of a discursive approach to 
learning for which communication technology offers valuable affordances. Add to the 
mix Habermas’s focus on discourse and his appreciation of a democratic public sphere 
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and it is not difficult to see why many online innovations, particularly civic networks, 
claim to be grounded on Habermasian foundations (see, for example Neuman, Bimber & 
Hindman, 2011). However, Habermas’s influence is not confined to open forums and his 
work was an early point of reference in more formal settings. For example Boyd  (1996: 
180) linked computer-mediated conferencing (CMC) in higher education with 
Habermas’s notion of ‘practical discourse’ in which ‘the only determinants of the 
outcome of the discussion are the solidity of facts and the logicality and 
comprehensiveness of the arguments’. Boshier (1990) identified possibilities for a kind of 
‘ideal speech situation’ through electronic networks and Rheingold took his enthusiasm 
for informal networking into the classroom and wanted new electronic networks to serve 
as a rehearsal for the ‘open, rational, critical debate proposed by Habermas and others’ 
(Rheingold, 2008: 101). Cecez-Kecmanovic & Webb (2000) saw online collaborative 
learning as requiring a Habermasian ideal speech situation offering ‘equal access by all 
participants to the learning process, equal opportunity and unrestricted contributions to 
collaborative learning, at least from a technical point of view’ (2000: 2). Wegerif (1998) 
was rather more tentative and while he put forward the idea that CMC might be a 
suitable medium for ‘establishing what Habermas calls an ideal speech situation’ he was 
sceptical that this would happen in practice. More optimistically McConnell (1994) felt 
that aspects of online group work were aligned with Habermas's knowledge-constitutive 
interests. 
While it is not difficult to find enthusiasm for Habermas amongst those proposing forms 
of online discussion, Habermas himself has not written in any depth on this topic and 
what he has written about ‘the Internet’ is at best lukewarm. More specifically he 
recognised the opportunity which technology offered to circumvent controls in 
undemocratic regimes but expressed concerns over the ‘fragmented nature’ of online 
networks (Habermas, 2006: 423). He also attached importance to face-to-face discussion 
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when discussing modern mass media (Jeffries 2010) and indeed for Habermas the public 
sphere was constituted by face-to-face discussion of texts not the texts themselves. 
Limited as these contributions have been, they imply some scepticism in regard to the 
emancipatory potential of online interaction based, it would seem, on a perception that 
technology might limit a genuinely public discussion. Hence the purpose of this paper is 
to ask what, if anything, can we really learn from Habermas, which might be important 
or relevant in understanding the educational potential of online interaction?  
THE VALUE OF A HABERMASIAN PERSPECTIVE ON JOINT MEANING MAKING ONLINE 
In answering the above question our argument is that a Habermasian perspective offers a 
way of thinking about joint meaning making online by providing a rationale for 
consensus; a distinction between strategic and emancipatory purposes; and a 
questioning of techno-romantic thinking. Each is considered below. 
Habermas, firstly, provides an ontological rationale for consensus (knowledge is fallible 
and the best foundation we have for validity is rational intersubjective agreement) and an 
epistemology for assessing the validity of a claim to knowledge (the force of the stronger 
argument). Learners need to construct their own understandings as there are no 
guarantees concerning the validity or transferability of pre-existing knowledge. On the 
other hand, something other than a purely subjective perspective is needed for there has 
to be a rigorous and ethical process for discriminating between different arguments 
/courses of action and this requires the kind of rational critical discourse captured by 
communicative action.  As Bamber and Crowther put it, this in the context of f2f 
professional learning, it is through communicative discourse that learners ‘construct ever 
more dependable, in the sense of justifiable and tested, normative structures on which 
action can be based’  (Bamber & Crowther, 2012: 188).  
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Habermas is placed between post modernism, which he accused of ‘performative 
contradiction’ by employing concepts that only modern reason can provide only to 
undermine these very concepts (Habermas, 1987: 337-341), and an out-dated positivism, 
which claimed that there was an objective truth. Of course Habermas’s position is far 
from unusual in regard to social theory or investigation of online spaces. Indeed it is 
often argued by those promoting online interaction that it is through the effort of 
explaining and defending positions that new knowledge can be generated (e.g., 
Scardamalia & Bereiter, 2006, Schrire, 2006). Furthermore, central to many conceptions 
of online knowledge building is the idea of searching for consensus, as seen, for example, 
in problem based learning (PBL) (e.g. Derry et al. 2006); virtual mathematics teams (e.g., 
Stahl, 2005; Wee & Looi, 2009); the generation of ‘just in time knowledge’ (e.g. Bonamy 
& Haugluslaine-Charlier, 1995) and of ‘joint artefacts’ (e.g. Murphy, 2004); models of 
community of inquiry (e.g. Garrison, 2007); the practice of peer assessment (e.g. 
McConnell, 2000) etc. Less ambitiously, collaboration and sharing of perspectives are 
also seen as providing opportunities for individual learning in the context of community 
participation (e.g. Salmon et al., 2010). 
A Habermasian perspective on consensus, however, brings a distinctive perspective on 
joint meaning making as it recalibrates how we think about knowledge building and the 
kind of evidence that we can provide to show that knowledge building has taken place. 
For Habermas communicative action was concerned with the coordination of activity 
and, to the extent that it was reflexive and critical, communication could be considered 
communicative and to serve emancipatory purposes. Searching for consensus was 
important but only if claims to knowledge were intensely interrogated. For example, in 
recognition of Habermas’s interest in language (Habermas, 2001), suppose a proposal 
were put forward to make English a common second language to be taught in all 
schools, either globally or, more realistically, within a particular geographical / political 
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region, on the grounds that this would facilitate cross national communication. 
Following Habermas’s discussion of communicative action (see Habermas, 1990 and 
discussion in Beemer, 2006: 91-93) this proposal might be considered in terms of its 
objectivity (for example ‘Is there, say, a case for thinking that a common language 
facilitates communication?’; ‘Is the proposed second language comparatively difficult to 
learn?’); sincerity (‘Is the proposal consistent with other statements that the proposer has 
put forward?’, ‘Has the proposer some special interest in promoting a common second 
language?’); and rightness (‘Will a common second language advantage those for whom it 
also their first language?’, ‘Will it disadvantage those who have little facility for language 
learning?’). As the proposal is debated similar questions will be asked of other 
propositions and special focus given to the process by which any consensus was 
achieved, for example ‘Did some participants defer to those with superior class or social 
positions?’, ‘Was the evidence available to everyone?’, ‘Were all able to contribute?’ and 
so on. In practice, of course, there are restrictions on all discussions, subjective 
understandings will not disappear and, indeed, an important point to bear in mind is that 
insincerity in Habermas encompassed more than a deliberate attempt to mislead, it took in 
our own distorted understanding of our intentions. Nonetheless, through a commitment 
to communicative action, participants may move from subjectively held positions 
towards a reflexive understanding of their own position and, in the process, generate 
more reliable knowledge.     
This argument for sustained debate is not of course ignored in the field of educational 
technology, but the research can often seem to be dominated by instrumental concerns 
(whether learning outcomes can be improved with the use of technology, e.g., Hiltz, et 
al., 2000); the fit of technology-supported collaboration with ‘twenty first century skills’ 
(e.g., Harasim, 1996); and a search for technological affordances  (e.g., Boyd, 1996, 
Conole & Dyke, 2004).  Problematic too has been an over reliance on analysing meaning 
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making through content analysis of messages, as picked up, for example, in Wee & Looi 
(2009: 476-479). This interest in content analysis was triggered by Henri’s (1992) initial 
use of interactive, cognitive, and metacognitive categories of content though frameworks were 
later refined (see De Wever et al. 2006 for an overview); for example Gunawardena et 
al.’s (1997) scheme included several categories, including sharing/comparing of information; 
discovery of dissonance and inconsistency; and negotiation of meaning/co-construction of knowledge, 
which more directly address the process of knowledge building. These and other 
frameworks throw useful light on what is being discussed, and often by whom it is being 
discussed, but a Habermasian perspective asks a different, and often neglected question, 
‘Is what is being discussed ‘true’ and, if it is, how would we know?’ 
Thus a Habermasian perspective reminds us that a fundamental purpose for inquiry is to 
uncover ‘truth’ and here, Habermas introduced a distinction between genuine and false 
consensus. Genuine consensus requires unconstrained debate within an ideal speech 
situation and involves the interrogation of power among participants. What this means in 
practice is that the grounds for a claim need to be explored critically and with an 
underlying principle that all should show uncertainty and open up the possibility that 
they may be mistaken irrespective of their role or the positions they may seek to protect. 
As Dunn & Lantolf (1998: 431) argued, this in the context of academic discourse, when 
interpretations diverged, the task was not to ‘engage in strategic or teleological discourse 
to convince an interlocutor to see things one’s own way or to gain an advantage for one’s 
own interests’ but ‘nothing less than active and intense dialogic engagement with these 
different discourses and world views’.  
Key to a genuine consensus is an ideal speech situation. Habermas’s concept can be and 
has been criticised for being idealised (for Lukes, 1982, it is infeasible), but unlike major 
works of Critical Theory Habermas is not easily dismissed as utopian, anti-technology in 
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intent or, in spite of his grounding in historical materialism, narrowly class based. Ideal 
speech was, at least for Habermas, something that could be experienced by all in part and 
in principle was understood by all those who commit to communication. However it was 
offered as a counterfactual and as such its purpose was to consider the gap (or a missed 
opportunity) between ‘is’ (what does happen) with ‘ought’ (communicative action). How 
can this critical perspective be applied to joint meaning making online? Perhaps the key 
insight it offers is that learning through online interaction is not and cannot be in itself 
‘learning by participation’ in a community of practice (Lave and Wenger being a key 
point of reference for Gunawardena et al., 2009; Gray, 2004; Nett, 2008; Thomas, 2005 
and many others). Instead learning is rather a particular form of participation in which 
we give reasons and make explicit claims to validity in full knowledge that we may have 
got it wrong, that our positions are distorting our understanding and that others will, in 
good faith, see things differently.   
A critical approach is important as so many of the contexts in which online interaction is 
presented are benign – for example the formal learning environments cited earlier but 
also informal communities for support groups (e.g. Lasker, Sogolow & Sharim, 2005), 
interest groups (e.g. Barton, 2012) and professional networks (e.g. Gray, 2004). It is easy 
to be sanguine about the affective and motivational gains from participation in these 
contexts and to identify a process of ‘knowledge building’ without asking difficult 
questions as to the status of that knowledge.  However there are plenty of less benign 
online contexts. These are often associated with informal participation, for example ‘far 
right’ groups in Belgium (e.g. Cammaerts, 2009) and race hate groups in USA (e.g. 
McNamee, Peterson & Peña, 2010), but they also include formal learning contexts as in 
Eve & Brabazon’s (2008) discussion of highly ‘gendered and sexualised’ online discourse 
in the unexpected context of first-year university students in a physical classroom. These 
are all cases of participation through which members might too feel a sense of 
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connection, of empowerment and, if participation is learning, then learning is taking 
place.  A critical perspective is needed to underline these claims for these three cases 
were ones of distorted communication, contexts in which strategic rather than 
communicative action was being promoted and in which sectional advantage not ‘mutual 
recognition’ was sought. In short members were concerned to gain at the expense of 
others.  
It is now clear that a third contribution of a Habermasian perspective is that it critiques 
a techno-romantic view of technology. Here the earlier literature tended to see online 
settings, and asynchronous interaction in particular, as having advantages over f2f ones 
as a form of communication. In particular learners could easily initiate many-to-many 
discussions for themselves and they could respond as and when they saw fit. Many felt 
that power differentials were less obvious online (for example Hiltz and Turoff, 1978 and 
later, and subtly, Matsuda, 2002). Online interaction seemed to create new patterns of 
turn taking and to overcome the dominance of particular individuals. The archiving of 
messages was seen as allowing for more reflective argumentation and a ‘rhythm’, which 
better supported deliberative consensus (see, for example, Anderson, 2004; Boyd, 1996; 
Cecez-Kecmanovic & Webb, 2000; Harasim, 2000; Mason & Kaye, 1989; McConnell, 
2000). There were features of online environments, for example a removed audience and 
an absence of immediate feedback, which could lead to lessened inhibition but these 
could also support intimacy and group bonding as, for example Barak, Boniel-Nissim & 
Suler (2008) argue in the context of online support groups.  
Some of these, often earlier, claims about online affordances have become seen as 
overstated and it is recognised that participants in both formal and informal 
environments are differentiated in their behaviour. For example, as Cecez-Kecmanovic 
& Webb (2000) identify, learners will have different orientations to learning; achieving an 
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end; and self-presentation. Only some members of forums appear willing or able to 
engage in exploratory talk (Littleton & Whitelock, 2005), only some will lead discussion 
in open settings (e.g. Butler et al., 2002) and significant numbers prefer to act the role of 
so-called ‘lurker’ (e.g. Takahashi, et al., 2003). Participants are differentiated in their 
attitudes, self-confidence, self-esteem, cultural background and linguistic ability.  As 
Coco and Short (2004) put it, in the context of civic networks but of wider significance, 
online communities are ‘social constructions’ and reflect existing patterns of power and 
cultural constraints as well as habits and history. Thus technology really might allow new 
environments for, and new forms of, interaction, but the attempt to draw conclusions 
from particular technological affordances is ‘putting the cart before the horse’. A 
Habermasian perspective, in contrast, would start by asking how can genuine consensus 
be reached before considering the media, which could be employed to support the 
participants in reaching a consensus.   
Problems with a Habermasian perspective 
A Habermasian perspective, it is argued, enables a critical view of online interaction, one 
that is focused on the process of deliberative discourse not on the ‘affordances’ of the 
technology. Such a perspective would support members in their attempts to reach 
genuine consensus, at least consensus concerning what should count as evidence when 
promoting and critiquing their respective positions. A Habermasian perspective provides, 
too, a rigorous and more defensible ontological and epistemological basis for knowledge 
building. Should we all then be Habermasian? There are problems with Habermas and 
three have particular relevance in the context of online meaning making: a perceived 
privileging of discourse over action, a lack of practical detail; and the infeasibility 
of consensus.  
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A general complaint made about Habermas is that he was privileging a kind of white, 
middle class discourse (e.g. Chernela, 1997) and idealising language (e.g. Susen, 2013). 
In fact these criticisms, alongside a greater concern for the sociological constraints on 
emancipatory action, were to some extent at least addressed by Habermas in his later 
work.  For example, in discussing feminism and the politics of equality he argued that it 
was not enough to provide legal basis for equality without touching the ‘fundamental 
levels of a society’s cultural self-understanding’ (Habermas, 1998: 209). Perhaps the more 
telling criticism of Habermas’s communicative action was that it privileged discourse 
over action, and a very wordy abstract style of discourse at that. To his critics Habermas 
was envisaging an almost endless revisiting of the conditions for consensus that had little 
appeal in practical contexts. It is, therefore no surprise that, say, Garrison, Anderson & 
Archer (2001) aligned their community of inquiry model with Dewey rather than 
Habermas. For while Dewey and Habermas both held largely ‘pragmatic’ positions on 
knowledge building and consensus, and both drew on the earlier work of Peirce, Dewey 
offered a more action oriented approach, though note not one based on trial and error 
(Dewey, 1922 [2007]:190). Dewey, however, offered a less nuanced and less sociological 
description of inter-subjective agreement and Habermas, rather than Dewey might have 
greater relevance for the specifically discursive dimension of meaning making in the field 
of CSCL. 
Habermas’s work is often seen as particularly abstract and not translatable into a 
framework of analysis. In part this is because there is not one single version of Habermas 
to work from – though a communicative reason has been a common concern 
throughout his work - and in part it is because Habermas has carried out few empirical 
studies, and of course relevant to our case, none pertains to online worlds. However, he 
does provide some principles from which educators can work, including key questions 
related to the design, leadership and research of online interaction.  
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Turning first to the design of online interaction, Habermas can help frame the right question 
(‘How can discussion be generated and a sense of reciprocity be best maintained?’) rather 
than say which strategies should be adopted. Thus approaches such as PBL, inquiry 
learning, reciprocal teaching, co-mentoring and so on may be valued as providing triggers 
for, and motivations to sustain, discussion but they need to be evaluated critically. For 
example, from a Habermasian perspective, designers will want to ask whether strategies   
lead participants to adopt surface or instrumental strategies as often seems to happen in 
practice and whether small-group working would lead to the generation of strategic 
groups interests at the expense of a wider more public discussion.   
In respect to the leading of discussion, Habermas can help direct attention as to whether 
the performance of the role of a tutor in formal learning settings (or moderator role in 
informal ones) contributes to, or constrains, open debate. On one hand having a tutor 
might introduce too high a degree of asymmetry within groups, after all a tutor has a 
power and prestige denied to others (see McConnell, 2000). On the other hand, the tutor 
might help maintain a sense of reciprocity by, for example, identifying asymmetries and 
patterns of deference; reminding participants that all points of view need to be 
considered; and modelling a reflexivity which might be new for some and difficult to 
embrace. In considering their interventions, tutors are faced with two possible 
‘performative contradictions’.  The first is that they act in the belief that it is only through 
their own efforts and direction that emancipatory learning can be ‘delivered’. This is a 
contradiction as it views the learner as strategically compliant. The second, rather 
different, contradiction is that tutors show a lack of sincerity by pretending they do not 
have specialised knowledge to offer, or do not notice things which are noteworthy, when 
in fact they do (a point well made in Bamber & Crowther, 2012). Faced with these 
challenges tutors might need to accept that learning is invitational, but that they have the 
responsibility to help support discussion while seeking to reduce asymmetry by showing 
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uncertainty and exercising reflexivity. This is a stance well modelled in the particular 
circumstance of mentoring in Yukawa (2006: 220 – 221). 
A wider responsibility for those leading discussion, though one going beyond the scope 
of an individual tutor, is to offer support to those lacking confidence and communicative 
competence to take part. This is to recognise that open communication is not simply 
secured by giving everyone the ‘de jure’ right to participate but that ‘de facto’ there are 
those who feel less powerful, either for personal reasons and / or because of ‘distorted 
classification roles’. Reducing asymmetry is a challenge for those exploring the 
implications of Habermas’s thinking in f2f settings (e.g. Gillespie et al., 2014) and a 
general focus for those seeking to establish more democratic civic online networks (e.g. 
Pinkett, 2003); experiences in both cases point to the size of the challenge and the 
resources needed to address it. 
Finally, in relation to research, Habermas’s concern for validity claims and the moral 
purpose of communication can be adopted as a lens on activity rather than a particular 
method or methodology.  Three cases illustrate this. In the first Hansen, Berente & 
Lyytinen (2009) used a Habermasian perspective to understand collaborative activity to 
produce entries in the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia. In this study Wikipedia could be 
regarded as an environment for rational discourse to the extent to which: 
(1) actors sincerely intend to engage in a cooperative search for truth; (2) through 
a formalized structure; (3) by excluding the use of force; (4) by meeting the rules 
of the ideal speech situation; (5) while engaging in a discourse that is open and 
continued for an extended period. (Hansen, Berente & Lyytinen, 2009: 42) 
The authors were cautiously optimistic that Wikipedia conformed to these requirements, 
but this is not the key point. Rather, the study showed that judgements about the quality 
of online interaction hinged on the process of communication and the ethical purposes 
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which communication served.  In a second example, Schwarz & De Groot (2007), with a 
nod towards Habermas, sought to evaluate an innovation in the history classroom by 
showing that autonomy, collaboration, commitment to reasoning, ethical communication 
and procedural mediation were important foci for evaluation of an online environment.   
In a third example, Yukawa’s (2006) interest in intersubjective understanding led to a 
concern for ‘truth, sincerity and rightness’ as evidence of the co-construction of 
knowledge. This led to the marshalling of evidence within a narrative inquiry of two 
graduate students’ projects related to telementoring of school students.  
These three studies took different approaches but all treated knowledge building as a 
process rather than ‘a thing’; and drew on different sources of data including online texts, 
student assignments, journal entries and interviews. The relationships between researcher 
and those being researched went beyond surface reading of online texts and evaluation 
of learning outcomes went beyond the instrumental.   
However, the three examples all concerned indeterminate contexts or at least ones in 
which there was an easily perceived normative dimension. Introducing such a dimension 
may be less intuitively obvious in more abstract fields of inquiry, for example the learning 
of mathematics - a frequently reported context in the field of CSCL (e.g, Stahl, 2011; 
Wee & Looi, 2009). One way to show the relevance of a Habermasian perspective here is 
to draw on accounts such as Morselli & Boero’s (2009) study of students’ understanding 
of mathematical proof, albeit a study undertaken in a f2f context. In this paper the 
authors accepted that there were objective grounds by which the ‘rightness’ (or ‘objective 
epistemic rationality’) of an argument could be judged but they drew on Habermas to 
show that mathematical knowledge could not be reduced to the realm of instrumental 
reasoning (‘Does procedure X give the right answer?’), arguing instead that questions of 
mathematical proof necessarily involved intersubjective understanding for which 
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communication was essential. Habermas’s work has further been helpful in analysing 
group work in the teaching and learning of mathematics not just to provide insight into 
how meaning is negotiated in a classroom but how communication and collaboration can 
break down into strategic positioning (e.g. Kent, 2013). Neither Kent nor Morselli and 
Boero, however, drew on the ethnomethodological approach associated with CSCL 
research into Virtual Math Teams (see for example Koschmann et al., 2004). This leaves 
open the question as to whether there can be some overlap between Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology and Habermas and the work carried out in these respective traditions. 
Beemer (2006), amongst others, thought there could be in that both Garfinkel and 
Habermas are concerned with fine-grained analysis of language and exploring patterns 
and sequencing, both are concerned too with how order is established in conversation 
and with what consequences. However, an important difference is that Habermas 
explored intentionality (not least due to a concern for ‘sincerity’) and work carried out 
within the Habermasian tradition has sought to directly address structural limits on 
agency in distinctive ways. 
The third criticism, and the one that goes right to the heart of Habermas, is that genuine 
consensus is not achievable or even desirable. This is taken up in the context of online 
collaboration by Hodgson & Reynolds (2005) – though note that their paper is not an 
argument with Habermas and there is much in its critique of a technological reductionist 
approach to learning which fits easily into Habermas’s ‘anti scientism’. Hodgson & 
Reynolds, however, in contrast to Habermas saw consensus as coercive:   
To be a member of a community usually entails subjugation to its core values and 
norms of behaviour, and to deviate from these in resisting assimilation is to run 
the risk of becoming marginalised in order that the integrity of the community is 
preserved (Hodgson and Reynolds, 2005: 16). 
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Thus striving for consensus may be felt oppressively particularly by those holding 
minority or counter cultural views and the authors argue instead for looser networks of 
online learners and recognition that our sense of identity shifts as we move in and out of 
groups and communities. In short the authors saw value in pluralism and the acceptance 
of difference as both welcome and democratic. In fact their perspective on online 
interaction ends up resembling a kind of networked individualism proposed by Wellman, 
Boase & Chen (2002) more than a Habermasian discourse community, though they took 
the metaphor of ‘city life’ to capture their proposal for a tolerant, ‘live and let live’ online 
cosmopolitanism. 
There is much here that is attractive but there are objections to embracing online ‘city 
life’. For example, from a Habermasian perspective consensus is an aspiration, rather 
than a literal outcome of discussion. In practice the best we can do is to strive towards 
consensus, while recognising the unstable nature of that consensus and being transparent 
with our claims to validity. Discussion can finish with an agreement to disagree but in the 
process participants may gain a reflexive understanding as to why they disagree and a 
move towards intersubjective understanding and mutual recognition. It is the attempt to 
reach consensus that is both a moral and genuinely educational one and if rational 
consensus were to be dismissed as a possibility then the scope of any discussion would 
be diminished along with its emancipatory potential.  
Furthermore, while the evidence is mixed, there is at least a realistic prospect that, under 
the right conditions, reaching greater intersubjective understanding is possible.  
Habermas, himself, cited several empirical studies to show this was the case or, in his 
own words, that ‘the process of group deliberation resulted in a unidirectional change 
and not in a polarization of opinions’ (Habermas, 2006: 414).  There is further cautiously 
optimistic support in research on an Internet enabled public sphere.  For example Price 
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(2009) found that in two citizen panels in the USA in which political discussion took 
place over an extended period some open exchanges of controversial ideas took place 
and a ‘more nuanced understanding of issues’ reached. In the online classroom 
collaboration has been seen as fostering understanding of other viewpoints and Austin 
(2006), in work involving schools in Ireland and Northern Ireland, argued that structured 
pedagogic interventions across cultural divides could ‘widen perspectives’ and provide 
knowledge about the ‘outgroup’. Of course conditions are important and not all evidence 
points the same way. The ‘Internet’, particularly in anonymised, unmoderated spaces, can 
provide a stage for political extremism, strategic intransience, bullying and intimidation. 
As Austin (2006) also discussed forum members, faced with points of view, which 
threaten their status, may end up holding on to their existing positions with greater 
certainty.  However while context is everything, it is not difficult to imagine that 
participants committed to ‘the cooperative search for truth’ might come closer to 
understanding each other and move towards agreement based on rationale grounds. 
They may be able to see such movement as ‘emancipatory’ as well as take advantage of 
more instrumental benefits, almost, as in Lewin’s early work on groups, irrespective of 
the decisions that are taken (Lewin, 1997 [1951]). At least a case can be made that it is 
worthwhile to make the effort. 
Perhaps a more subtle response to Hodgson and Reynolds is to accept that consensus is 
in practice unlikely but to throw out striving for consensus as one aim of online 
interaction is perverse. Outhwaite (2013) teasingly suggested that for Habermas to think 
about language primarily in terms of communicative rationality was to hold as 
fundamentalist position as catholic doctrine which considered sex solely in terms of 
procreation. Thus if looking only to celebrate, in online or off line contexts, the diversity 
of communication, the creativity and playfulness of performance, the opportunities for 
shuffling between various versions of self as well as the sheer utilitarian value of 
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exchange of information we can give Habermas a miss. If we want to imagine how one 
purpose of online interaction might be to promote intersubjective, reflexive 
understanding then it is to Habermas we might turn. 
CONCLUSION 
Habermas offered a perspective on language: how we use language and with what 
consequences. He did this from a critical theory tradition and presented a picture of 
communicative action that was optimistic, but in its exploration of the different realms to 
communication was demanding. We have suggested that a Habermasian perspective on 
joint meaning making online is possible and such a perspective will be concerned with 
the striving for genuine consensus through unconstrained dialogue, a process in which 
participants interrogate their own beliefs and actively engage with opposing points of 
view. Habermas offers a corrective to the overly literal accounts of knowledge building in 
the educational technology literature. A Habermasian perspective asks us to view 
participation critically and not to reduce learning to participation.   Criticisms of our 
Habermasian perspective include a lack of practical detail and a sense that it is not 
sufficiently action focused. While critics would argue that genuine consensus is not 
achievable, from Habermas we can better understand the importance of striving for such 
consensus. Habermas reminds us that at heart it is though language that we understand 
the world and coordinate our action in the world.  
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